This study documents new evidence on the relationship between firms financial reporting behavior and engagement in corporate fraud. Using a matched sample of 184 companies over an eight-year period from 2003 to 2010, we empirically examine whether firms that practice aggressive financial reporting are more likely to be involved in corporate fraud. We determine aggressive financial reporting by (1) conducting a time-series test of timely loss recognition and (2) using asymmetric timeliness of earnings models. Our results show that firms with fraudulent financial statements employ aggressive financial reporting during the two years prior to the occurrence of fraud. Specifically, we found that firms engaged in fraud have significantly less timely loss recognition and lower asymmetric timeliness of earnings compared to firms not engaged in fraud. The result is robust even after including various controls. We conclude that aggressive reporting provides an early sign of the potential for corporate fraud, and thus contributes towards efforts to deter fraud.
Introduction
Corporate fraud has received special attention in the business community as its occurrence could affect it in many ways. For the businesses in which corporate fraud is revealed, the negative impact involves both internal and external parties. A recent survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011) reported that the victims of economic fraud in Malaysia incurred financial losses of between US$100,000 to US$5,000,000 during the year. In addition to the financial losses, the companies also experienced significant collateral damage including damage to employee morale, brand, reputation and business relationships (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011) . Corporate fraud causes companies to lose potential investors and stockholders confidence. Negative exposure from the media could change the perception of business communities in which the company operates. Revelation of corporate fraud could also lead to decreases in firm value or even closure of the business. For example, a Malaysian company, Transmile Group Berhad, showed an 80% jump in revenue in its 2006 unaudited report. The company also reported a huge increase in trade receivables, from RM111 million to RM381 million; and an increase in profit from RM75 million to RM158 million. However, audit revealed that the financial statements were falsified and the company actually incurred net losses of RM370 million and RM126 million for the respective years. As a consequence, Transmile s stock dropped by 47% in June 2007 (Fong, 2007) .
According to Yu, Zhen and Zhang (2010) , corporate fraud is a classic manifestation of the agency problem and of weak corporate governance. The principal-agent problem arises when the owners (principal) grant the authority to the managers (agents) to act on their behalf (Ross, 1973) . Basically, it is due to divergence of interests and asymmetry of information between the managers and owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) , agency problems could be eliminated if both parties had the same interests. However, if agents and principals are completely different parties their interests might not be aligned. The agents might have the incentive to maximize their own wealth at the expense of the principals. Moreover, the agents have the advantage of having more or better information than the principals do in terms of the decision situation, or the consequences of actions (Ross, 1973) .
Research into detection of corporate fraud has been a subject of interest for many researchers. Erickson et al. (2004) documented the association between fraudulent activities and tax payments. They found that firms pay taxes on inflated earnings to conceal evidence of fraud. Ettredge et al. (2008) show that pre-tax income, deferred tax expense and book-to-market provide incremental information in distinguishing between fraud and non-fraud firms. In Malaysia, Hasnan et al. (2012) investigates factors associated with fraudulent financial reporting practices, including the management s predisposition, motive and opportunity. The study found that firms with fewer related party transactions, a higher number of prior violations, and a greater proportion of founders on the board are more likely to be involved in fraudulent financial reporting than are other firms. In addition, they also revealed that firms are more likely to engaged in fraudulent financial reporting when non-family and non-foreigners own the company and when the level of financial distress is high. Their study also found that weak corporate governance and political connection contributes towards the likelihood of corporate fraud.
Our study aimed to examine whether firms that practice aggressive financial reporting are more likely to be involve in corporate fraud than those that do not. We examine a Malaysian sample of 184 companies, comprising 92 companies that engaged in fraud and 92 matching companies that did not engage in fraud. Our study is closely related to Alam and Petruska (2012) , which investigates the level of conservatism of companies that engaged in fraud identified in SEC Enforcement releases. However, we focus our study on the emerging market. Our decision is based on the Ernst and Young (2006) survey report, which claimed that fraud is more likely to occur in emerging markets as compared to developed markets, due to weak internal control.
Hypothesis Development
We posit that firms that practice aggressive reporting are more likely to engage in corporate fraud. According to Perols and Lougee (2011) , firms manipulate earnings to increase the amount of reported earnings. The upward manipulation of earnings can be done through aggressive reporting or by committing fraud (Perols & Lougee, 2011) . However, firms that have aggressively managed earnings in prior years have limited ability to inflate earnings within the boundaries allowed by accounting standards. The constraints lead to a higher likelihood of these companies inflating revenue by committing fraud.
Consequently, Alam and Petruska (2012) claim that aggressive accounting, in terms of accounting conservatism, could be a potential predictor of corporate fraud. This claim is based on the argument that fraud firms have weaker corporate governance systems in place during the period prior to a fraud being committed. In addition to that, Krishnan (2005) shows that Houston clients of Arthur Andersen practiced more aggressive financial reporting compared to Houston clients audited by other Big Six auditors. The lack of conservative practice in Arthur Andersen s Houston clientele is in line with aggressive reporting being a determinant for financial fraud.
Research Design
The study focuses on all Malaysian public listed firms from year 2003 to 2010. Following Hasnan et al. (2012) , we define firms with corporate fraud as being firms in which corporate fraud was revealed by lawsuits when these firms breached the regulations of Bursa Malaysia and the (Malaysian) Securities Commission. In certain situations, the same fraud and lawsuit were reported more than once. In that case, the fraud and lawsuit disclosed in the earlier year was used to represent the firms with fraud and lawsuit cases. We obtained a list of companies that breached the regulations of Bursa Malaysia and the Securities Commission from records kept in the Accounting Research Institute, UiTM Malaysia. From the list, we identified an initial sample of 114 cases, but the limitation of data and repetition of cases reduced our observations to 92 cases only. In this study, we focus on observations from two years before the fraud occurred. We then identified the match (control) sample based on general industry classification system codes (GICS four digit) and year of observations. We employed two measures for aggressive/conservative financial reporting. The first measure examines the time-series behavior of earnings changes, based on a model used in Basu (1997) and Ball et al. (2000) . This measure exploits the transitory nature of economic income. Transitory gain and loss components measure the tendency for increases and decreases in accounting income to reverse (Basu, 1997) . The second measure examines the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. In this model, conservatism is defined as the extent to which current period accounting earnings asymmetrically incorporate economic losses relative to economic gain. Accounting earnings imposes different verification standards for recognition of different types of economic news. For bad news (negative stock returns), lower verification standards are used, which results in the immediate recognition of losses. However, for good news (positive stock return), higher verification standards are imposed for gains to be recognized in accounting earnings, which results in delayed recognition of gains.
In this study, we extend the time-series test of loss recognition and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings model to measure the relationship between aggressive reporting and corporate fraud. We include the dichotomous variable CF, corporate fraud, and the interaction variable of CF with the existing variables in both models. This procedure enables testing of aggressive financial reporting between the corporate fraud sample and the control sample. The modified models are stated below: (2) where FNI is the change in future year earnings; NI is the change in current year earnings standardized by total assets at the beginning of the year; D NI is a dummy variable equal to 1 if NI is negative, and 0 otherwise; E is the earnings per share for firm; P is the price per share at the beginning of the fiscal year; R is the annual return; D is a dummy variable that equals 1 if R is negative, and 0 otherwise; and is the error term.
For equation (1), a negative coefficient 3 indicates conservatism, hence the coefficient for CF x NI x D NI would be positive if the corporate fraud sample employs aggressive financial reporting. For equation (2), a positive coefficient for R x D indicates conservative reporting, thus this study predicts the coefficient for CF x R x D would be negative in the case of aggressive financial reporting in the corporate fraud sample. Following prior studies, we control for firm size, risks and growth options. We also control for auditor size because big audit firms are more likely to influence their clients to adopt more conservative accounting than small audit firms when the clients' financial performance is worse than expected (Chung, Firth, & Kim, 2003) . Table 2 reports the regression estimates of equations (1) and (2). In Panel A, the coefficient for NI x D NI is negative and significant in the control samples, suggesting that the negative serial correlation in earnings changes is driven by a reversal of negative earnings changes. For the corporate fraud sample, the coefficient for NI x D NI is positive but insignificant, showing no evidence of a reversal of negative earnings changes. As predicted, the coefficient for CF x NI x D NI is positive and significant, implying a more aggressive reporting of earnings in the corporate fraud sample as compared to the control sample.
Findings
Panel B presents the results for difference between the timeliness of earnings in recognition of good news and bad news for the corporate fraud sample and the control sample. The results show that the coefficients for R in both samples are positive and significant at the 1% level, showing that good news is recognized in a timely manner. The coefficient for R x D in the control sample, which measures the difference or the increment in the timeliness of earnings in recognizing bad news compared to good news is positive and significant at the 1% level.
This result shows evidence of timely loss recognition, i.e. conservative reporting of earnings, in the control sample. For the corporate fraud sample, the coefficient for R x D is not significant (p>0.10), implying no evidence of timely loss recognition. These results show that corporate fraud tends to delay/defer the recognition of unfavorable economic news as a strategy to inflate reported earnings. The coefficient for CF x R x D is negative and significant, showing that the corporate fraud sample reports more aggressive reporting than the control sample. 
Conclusions
This paper provides new evidence on aggressive financial reporting prior to corporate fraud. This study documents that firms, which engaged in fraud have significantly less timely loss recognition and lower asymmetric timeliness of earnings compared to firms not engaged in fraud during the two years prior to the occurrence of fraud. The results support the arguments that managers choose to take up fraudulent reporting when other possible means to inflate earnings are no longer available. The findings help the users of financial statements in assessing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting.
